A recent decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in In re Walker County Hospital Corporation serves as an important reminder to clients that are purchasing or renewing directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance coverage that the “Insured versus Insured” exclusion must contain the broadest possible exceptions for claims brought against directors and officers following a bankruptcy filing. Without the specific policy language, current and former directors and officers may be exposed to personal liability.

One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.

In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.

In our prior alert over the summer, we highlighted the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Stream TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc., 279 A.3d 323, 329 (Del.

Restructurings defy a one-size fits all approach because every deal is unique and different tools are required to solve different problems. At one end of the restructuring continuum is the so-called “amend and extend,” where the credit agreement is amended to provide incremental liquidity, extend near-term maturities, modify covenants or some combination of the foregoing. This approach is fast and cost-efficient, but limited in its impact. At the other end of the spectrum is a restructuring through chapter 11.

Navigating the Bankruptcy Code can present many traps for unsuspecting debtors, creditors, or asset buyers. The Delaware District Court recently reminded bankruptcy participants of an often overlooked pitfall involving the collision between (i) an unstayed bankruptcy sale order authorizing an asset sale free and clear of successor liability and (ii) federal labor law imposing successor liability on the buyer. See United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Buyer Alloy Steel LLC, Civ. No.

When debt restructuring discussions are at an impasse and the reservoir of goodwill between the parties has run dry, stakeholders face difficult choices. For a lender, one of the most powerful tools available is the exercise of rights under a voting proxy given by a parent holding company in connection with a pledge of a borrower’s stock or membership interests. Through the exercise of proxy rights, lenders may replace a borrower’s board of directors with a new board made up of independent directors.

Once again, we reflect on the prior year for restructuring trends impacting private credit lenders. Last year it was all about “liability management”—the latest trend in which the limits of sponsor-favorable loan documents are being tested, in some cases past the breaking point.

This past year was marked by extraordinary deal activity. Record breaking M&A activity drove record breaking private credit activity. Private equity M&A activity was at a substantial high, with over 8,500 deals worth $2.1 trillion, a 60% increase over 2020. Not surprisingly, in this environment, defaults were at all-time lows. The Proskauer Private Credit Default tracker showed an active default rate of approximately 1% at the end of 2021, compared to 3.6% in 2020.